Lyle service planning doctrine
AFDD 2-1 :This one definitely needs a refresh. You’ve gotta look at this one with some historical context – it was based on Joint Vision 2010, which was borne in the era of a “New American Way of Warfare” which often denigrated the role of ground forces or large scale operations – the same thinking behind Network Centric Warfare and Transformation. This document reflects some of the overoptimistic thinking on “dominance” that those concepts had as well, thus take it with multiple grains of salt. AFOTTP 2-2.1 Almost no one refers to this document anymore – JP 3-30 defines the air estimate process and takes priority, and to my knowledge there is no effort underway to update this, since much of it is replicated in AFDD 2 and the AOC TTP. Word I got when I was organizing the 13AF inspection as the IG was that this doc just hasn’t been officially dropped yet. It does give a good discussion of the difference between target based approaches vs effects based approaches, and it would be interesting to contrast this with the version of EBO that the Joint Staff rejected. Significant change since this was put out – at the time, the notion was that the AFFOR (service component commander = force provider to the joint force), when dual hatted as the JFACC (functional component commander = force consumer), would simply roll the same staff he used for the former job into the latter. As we found out in Bosnia and Kosovo, the skillsets for the two jobs are not the same, and it’s tough to do the service component functions well when you’ve gotta form the nucleus of a joint air component. This is why we formed first the Warfighting Headquarters, and then transitioned it to the Component NAF as the senior warfighting element of the USAF. By having separate AFFOR (USAF) and AOC (joint) staffs, we allow the former to concentrate on USAF force provider issues, and the latter to think more jointly and concentrate on JOPP/JOPPA processes, which work for “phase 0” as well as combat if you’re executing the GEF correctly. Yes, you still need both staffs to work together, and at both AOCs I’ve worked at (CAOC and 13 AF AOC at Hickam), we always invited the A staff members to participate in joint planning groups we ran – they’re often the ones who can identify the “long poles in the tent” that make notional COAs infeasible early on, and they also bring the advantages of a different orientation and focus to the creative process. Also helps to promote parallel planning between the AOC and AFFOR – surprises are seldom good when coordinating between staffs FM 3-0 You only have to read 4-1 through 4-10, but you’re getting extra tips as a bonus because I forgot to check the assignment sheet. Takeaways: Check out the “Tennessee Chart on page 2-5 for the Army’s interpretation of the spectrum of conflict, and underneath it for their definitions of the various modes of warfare. Ch 3: Full spectrum operations: not unlike the intent of EBO before the Joint Staff got ahold of it, but the Army usually has more diverse interactions with the operational environment than the air component traditionally does since we generally fly in, do our think out of a list of discrete functions, and fly back out (gross oversimplification, I know, but it partly explains why there are less than 20 missions to select from when you task a mission on an ATO). Battle command 'is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, '''and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy.' Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions. This is the all encompassing term for both deliberate and crisis action planning and execution, including everything from Design,to MDMP, to CAP. Usually applied to the Commanding General (CG) level, usually the Corps or above. Mission command 'is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined '''initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s' intent. – This is the all encompassing term for both deliberate and crisis action planning and execution in lower echelons, including everything from Design, to MDMP, to CAP and troop leading procedures. Usually applied at brigade and lower. Combined arms 'is the synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element of combat power was used separately or sequentially'. Think of this as a concept of “jointness” between the branches of the Army, not unlike the Air Ground Team concept of the USMC. ' '''MCDP 1-2 Campaigning' Compare the theoretical and historical background in this one to the other services. Hate to say it, but once again, in my humble opinion, the Marines are leading the way. Current applications of Clausewitz, Luttwak’s vertical and horizontal aspects of strategy, the Strange Model of COG analysis, planning forward and backward with conceptual planning (like US Army Design or the JAOP), functional planning (OPORD/AOD), and Detailed planning (MAAP/ATO, lower echelon plans), the last two phases in the JP 5 campaign model years before we got “Enable civil authority” added - all in here, even as far back as '97. Erosion strategy = JC Wylie’s cumulative strategy NAVY PLANNING NWP 5-01 Think we’re mixing apples and oranges a little here, since we didn’t cover MDMP or MCPP, but we’re looking at the first two steps of the Naval Plannning Process (NPP) for this lesson with the revision Col Kometer sent out. This is the Navy equivalent of JOPPA or the previously mentioned planning processes. Big picture – the Navy traditionally hasn’t been big on issuing doctrine or defining the operational level of warfare, but they’re good at executing, and actually have a great tradition of operational level thinking if you look at old books like Sound Military Decision, arguably the intellectual underpinnings of the Central Pacific Campaign in WWII http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/28178 . NPP was formerly called the “Commander’s Estimate of the Situation”, and NWC created some great decision support tools to assist with that process. Ask the NWC ion residence guys what they’re using today, it was still CES when I took the Distance course. This is what the guys in the brand spanking new Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) should be running…